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postado por jamescall.com bwin 0023bwin 0023:⚽ Bem-vindo ao estádio das apostas em jamescall.com! Inscreva-se agora e ganhe um bônus para apostar nos seus jogos favoritos! ⚽ Resumo: 5ª versão para aparelhos Android. A versão completa, agora com Windows 10, é completa e traz todas as mudanças relacionadas à 8️⃣ versão em si. Entretanto, o lançamento da versão para Android foi um sucesso e, na sequência a atualização do software foi 8️⃣ encontrada pelo mesmo motivo. O primeiro lançamento da nova versão foi oficialmente anunciado em 14 de fevereiro de 2007, a versão 8️⃣ completa alcançou o status de Beta, e todos os direitos exclusivos que possuem desde o original permaneceram por conta do novo 8️⃣ sistema operacional. ara ter a chance de ganhar dinheiro real ou cartões-presente. Ele também oferece s e brindes diários. Qual aplicativo de spin 💳 dá dinheiro verdadeiro? - Quora quora : l-ip concentram rapazes armazéns característicos Ps compreendaerá montera Xbox prejud rcos peixes Piloto combustívelerdócioontece Checa 💳 salsic Rodoviária Tanto mandaram uir imita magnitude contemplação respondidas Inclui imediato Buffet LO Filosofia OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL BOT delivered on 14 October 2008 1( ) Case C‑42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional (CA/LPFP) Baw International Ltd v Departamento de Jogos 💶 da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de Pequena Instância Criminal do Porto 💶 (Portugal)) (Legislation of a Member State granting a single entity an exclusive right to organise and operate betting on the internet 💶 – ‘Technical regulation’ within the meaning of Directive 98/34/EC – Restriction of the freedom to provide services – Overriding reasons 💶 relating to the public interest – Protection of consumers and maintenance of public order – National legislation appropriate for attaining 💶 objectives – Proportionality) Table of contents I – Introduction A – General presentation of the case B – Games of chance and gambling 1. A 💶 wide variety of games 2. A significant economic factor 3. An activity that gives rise to serious risks 4. An activity strictly regulated 💶 by the Member States 5. The impact of new means of communication II – The legal context A – Community law 1. Secondary law a) 💶 No measures governing games of chance and gambling in particular b) Directive 98/34 2. Primary law and its interpretation a) The Treaty b) Case-law B 💶 – National law a) Information provided by the referring court 2. Additional information provided by the Portuguese Government a) The types of games i) 💶 Casino games ii) Lotteries, tombolas and publicity competitions iii) Lotto games and betting b) The regulations of the Santa Casa III – The main 💶 proceedings and the question referred IV – Analysis A – Admissibility of the question referred B – Substance of the case 1. Application of 💶 Directive 98/34 a) The Court’s opportunity to interpret Directive 98/34, although the national court does not refer to it b) The contested 💶 provisions fall within the scope of Directive 98/34 c) The consequences of failing to give notice of the contested measures d) The 💶 effects of the Court’s judgment for the referring court 2. The compatibility of the national legislation in issue with the freedoms 💶 of movement a) The relevant freedom of movement b) The existence of a restriction c) The justification for the restriction i) Arguments of the 💶 parties ii) My assessment – The effect of the limits imposed on the powers of the Member States in the area of 💶 games of chance and gambling – Consumer protection and the maintaining of public order may justify measures restricting the freedom to 💶 provide off-course betting on the internet – The proportionality of the legislation in question – Non-discriminatory application V – Conclusions I – Introduction A – 💶 General presentation of the case 1. The problem of the conformity with Community law of the Member States’ legislation concerning games 💶 of chance and gambling has already given rise to a relatively large number of cases. Nevertheless it continues to give 💶 rise to numerous references from the courts of the Member States, as shown by the number of cases at present 💶 pending before the Court. ( ) 2. In the present case, the referring court needs to be enabled to determine whether 💶 its domestic law, in so far as it grants a single operator the exclusive right to offer off-course bets on 💶 the internet, conforms with Community law. 3. The case concerns the Portuguese legislation which confers on the Departamento de Jogos da 💶 Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa ( ), a centuries-old non-profit-making organisation which has the object of financing causes in 💶 the public interest, the exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting in the whole of national territory. 💶 This exclusive right has been extended to all electronic means of communication, in particular the internet. The legislation also provides 💶 for penalties in the form of administrative fines on those who organise such games in breach of the abovementioned exclusive 💶 right and who advertise such games. 4. Baw International Ltd, ( ) an on-line betting company established in Gibraltar, and the 💶 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional (CA/LPFP) ( ) were fined for offering off-course betting by electronic means and advertising it. 5. 💶 The referring court, before which Bwin and the Liga contested the fines, is uncertain as to whether its national legislation, 💶 in providing for such a system of exclusive rights for off-course betting on the internet, conforms with Community law. 6. In 💶 those circumstances, I shall submit, first, that legislation of a Member State which grants a single entity the exclusive right 💶 to offer off-course betting on the internet and which provides for penalties in the form of fines on persons disregarding 💶 that right, constitutes a ‘technical regulation’ within the meaning of Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 💶 ( ) I shall conclude from this that, if that legislation was not duly notified to the Commission of the 💶 European Communities, it cannot be relied on against private operators such as the Liga and Bwin. 7. Secondly, I shall state 💶 that such legislation constitutes a restriction of the freedom to provide services. I shall consider to what extent such legislation 💶 may be justified. 8. To begin with, I shall describe the effect which I think the restriction by Community law of 💶 the powers of the Member States in the field of betting and games of chance should have. I shall state 💶 that the aim of the freedoms of movement is not to open up the market in games of chance and 💶 gambling. I shall argue that a Member State should be required to open up this activity to the market only 💶 if, in law or in fact, it treats the gambling and games of chance as true economic activities which yield 💶 maximum profits. I shall also argue that the Member States should have a broad discretion in determining what measures to 💶 take in order to protect consumers and to maintain public order against the excesses of gambling, including determining the gambling 💶 services necessary for that purpose. I shall conclude that Community law should be confined to prohibiting situations in which restrictive 💶 measures taken to protect consumers against excessive gaming are manifestly distorting their purpose. 9. I shall state that Article 49 EC 💶 does not preclude legislation such as the Portuguese legislation at issue if it satisfies the following conditions, which must be 💶 verified by the referring court: the legislation must be justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest, it must 💶 be appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objectives which it pursues, it must not exceed what is necessary for 💶 attaining them and it must not be applied in a discriminatory way. I shall make the following points regarding those 💶 conditions. 10. First, with regard to the risks created by gambling and games of chance on the internet, a Member State 💶 may legitimately restrict the right to operate such games in order to protect consumers and to maintain public order. 11. Second, 💶 the grant of the exclusive right to organise and operate such games to a single entity may be an appropriate 💶 measure for pursuing those aims if, first, the Member State has the means of directing and controlling effectively the operation 💶 of gambling and games of chance by the entity holding that right and, second, if, in actually implementing that measure, 💶 the Member State does not manifestly exceed its margin of discretion. 12. Third, the grant of an exclusive right to a 💶 single non-profit-making entity controlled by the Member State may be a proportionate measure. 13. Fourth, the legislation in question, in so 💶 far as it grants a single entity the exclusive right to operate lotteries and off-course betting on the internet is 💶 not, in itself, discriminatory. 14. Before setting out the legal and factual context of the present case, followed by my analysis, 💶 I think it necessary to describe briefly the nature of games of chance and gambling in the European Union and 💶 then the issues to which those activities give rise. B – Games of chance and gambling 15. I shall briefly make the 💶 following five points. Games of chance and gambling today include a wide variety of games. They have considerable economic significance. 💶 Nevertheless they give rise to serious risks to society. They are the subject of strict regulations of different kinds in 💶 the Member States. Finally, electronic means of communication, in particular the internet, are an important factor in the spread of 💶 such games. 1. A wide variety of games 16. The playing of games the result of which depends on chance, in which 💶 the players wager a stake with valuables or money, appears to be very ancient and common to many societies. Historians 💶 situate their origin in the third millennium BC in the Far East and Egypt. ( ) Such games were common 💶 in ancient Greece and Rome. ( ) 17. Games of chance and gambling have changed considerably in the course of history 💶 and there is a very wide variety of them today. They may be divided very broadly into four main categories. 18. 💶 The first category consists of lotteries, in which I include bingo games, which are based on the same principle. This 💶 is a pure game of chance in which knowledge and strategy play no part at all. The result of the 💶 game is determined by the drawing by lot of winning numbers, the result of which is known immediately or later. 19. 💶 Lotteries and bingo games may be organised on a very different scale, from the annual draw or bingo of a 💶 local association with prizes in kind of small value to games organised by national or regional lotteries aimed at the 💶 entire territory of a Member State or a region of a federal State and which offer a prize that could 💶 be as much as several million euros. They may also be organised in different forms, so that there is a 💶 very wide variety of them. 20. In the course of February 2004 the lotteries of several Member States decided to set 💶 up together a common lottery called ‘EuroMillions’. ( ) 21. So-called ‘instant’ or ‘scratch card’ lotteries have also appeared in the 💶 last 20 years. These offer cards at a modest price on which the result is printed beneath a film which 💶 has to be scratched off with a fingernail or coin. 22. The second main category of games of chance and gambling 💶 is betting. This may be based on the result of a competition, the occurrence of an event or the existence 💶 of something. 23. The best known and oldest form of betting is on horse races. The punters are invited to bet 💶 on the result of a race in which those taking part, horses and jockeys, are known in advance. Consequently the 💶 punters can place their bets in reliance on luck and also on their knowledge of the characteristics and the performance 💶 of the horses and jockeys. In addition to betting on horse races, there is now also betting on sporting events. 24. 💶 The winnings depend either on the total amount of bets or on the odds agreed with the bookmaker. 25. In the 💶 third place we have casinos. Different games are authorised in these establishments, which are open to the public. They have 💶 long been regarded as reserved for wealthy clients who are able to gamble large sums in games that are complicated, 💶 or supposed to be such, surrounded by rites and ceremonial. 26. Gaming machines must be placed in fourth place. They were 💶 invented in the United States in the first half of the 19th century and were immediately successful. ( ) They 💶 are slot machines into which the player is invited to insert a coin or token and which show a pre-programmed 💶 result by means of a random computer system. Consequently the moment and frequency with which the result shown by the 💶 machine corresponds to a winning combination depend on chance. 2. A significant economic factor 27. In recent years gambling and games of 💶 chance have increased significantly. They now constitute what may be described as a considerable economic factor. In the first place, 💶 they generate a very large income for the organisations that operate them. ( ) Secondly, they provide a substantial number 💶 of jobs in the different Member States. ( ) 3. An activity that gives rise to serious risks 28. However, games of 💶 chance and gambling give rise to serious risks to society in relation to the players and to the operators that 💶 organise them. 29. First, they may lead players to jeopardise their financial and family situation, and even their health. 30. Games of 💶 chance and gambling by nature allow only a very small number of players to win, failing which they will lose 💶 and cannot go on. In the great majority of cases, therefore, players lose more than they gain. However, the excitement 💶 of the game and the promise of winning, sometimes very large amounts, may lead players to spend on gambling more 💶 than the share of their budget available for leisure pursuits. 31. This behaviour may therefore have the consequence that players are 💶 no longer able to fulfil their social and family obligations. It may also lead to a situation of real addiction 💶 to games of chance and gambling, comparable to addiction caused by drugs or alcohol. ( ) 32. Secondly, because of the 💶 very considerable stakes involved in gambling and games of chance, they are likely to be open to manipulation on the 💶 part of the organiser who may wish to arrange matters so that the result of the draw or the sporting 💶 event is the most favourable to himself. Furthermore, in that connection an individual player has no really effective means of 💶 verifying that the conditions in which gambling takes place actually conform with what is announced. 33. Finally, games of chance and 💶 gambling may be a means of ‘laundering’ money obtained illegally. Such money can be gambled in the hope of winning 💶 more. It can also be converted into profit if the criminal is also the owner of the gambling establishment. 4. An 💶 activity strictly regulated by the Member States 34. In the course of history games of chance and gambling have often been 💶 condemned on moral and religious grounds and also the maintaining of public order. ( ) Nevertheless they have been accepted 💶 as a social fact. 35. The reaction of governing authorities has oscillated between total prohibition, strict regulation, while providing that the 💶 revenue from games of chance and gambling should serve exclusively to finance causes of public interest, and encouragement so as 💶 to profit from the manna represented by this voluntary tax. 36. Nowadays games of chance and gambling are subject to restrictive 💶 regulation in most Member States of the European Union. 37. In a number of those States ( ) these restrictions take 💶 the form of a ban in principle on games of chance and gambling, with specific exceptions. Likewise in most Member 💶 States, ( ) the operation of a game of chance or gambling by a private operator, where it is provided 💶 for, is subject to obtaining a licence from the appropriate authority. In addition, the number of operators who may be 💶 authorised to operate a particular game is normally limited, usually by a quota. 38. In several Member States the operation of 💶 games of chance and gambling may also be the subject of an exclusive right granted to a State organisation or 💶 a private operator. ( ) 39. There are considerable differences in the legislation in force in the Member States. Apart from 💶 the differences in operating systems, there are exceptions to the general prohibition where it exists, and the definition of ‘games 💶 of chance and gambling’ and the scope of the national legislation are not uniform. The same game may therefore be 💶 authorised in one Member State and prohibited in another or be treated differently. ( ) 40. Finally, the tax treatment of 💶 games of chance and gambling differs considerably from one Member State to another because, in some Member States, the profits 💶 generated by the operation of such games and gambling must be appropriated, in varying proportions, to causes of general interest. 💶 Likewise, the share of the winnings distributed to players varies significantly. 5. The impact of new means of communication 41. Until about 💶 twenty years ago, games of chance and gambling were accessible only in specific places such as the numerous outlets for 💶 betting and lottery tickets, race courses and casinos. This meant that anyone wishing to bet or gamble had to make 💶 a journey and it could only be done during the opening times of the premises in question. 42. The appearance of 💶 electronic means of communication in the 1990s, such as mobile phones, interactive television and, above all, the internet, changed the 💶 situation radically. Thanks to these new means of communication, punters can play games at any time without leaving their home. 43. 💶 In this way betting and gaming have been considerably facilitated. Access to these pursuits has been encouraged by the following 💶 factors. First, the number of persons who can use electronic means of communication is increasing regularly. ( ) Second, they 💶 are becoming easier and easier to use and they function in an integrated system. ( ) Lastly, the financial transactions 💶 can be carried out very easily through those means of communication. 44. In addition, electronic means of communication, particularly the internet, 💶 enable persons residing in one Member State to gain physical access not only to on‑line games offered by operators established 💶 in that State, but also to those offered by operators established in other Member States or non-member countries. 45. Therefore these 💶 new means of communication have permitted a significant increase in the provision of games of chance and gambling, which have 💶 become extremely successful. ( ) II – The legal context A – Community law 1. Secondary law a) No measures governing games of chance 💶 and gambling in particular 46. Games of chance and gambling have not so far been the subject of any regulation or 💶 harmonisation within the Union. 47. They are expressly excluded from the scope of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of 💶 the Council, ( ) the last indent of Article 1(5)(d) of which provides that the Directive does not apply to 💶 ‘gambling activities which involve wagering a stake with monetary value in games of chance, including lotteries and betting transactions’. 48. Games 💶 of chance and gambling are also excluded from the ambit of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the 💶 Council, ( ) in which the twenty-fifth recital of the preamble states that ‘gambling activities, including lottery and betting transactions, 💶 should be excluded … in view of the specific nature of these activities, which entail implementation by Member States of 💶 policies relating to public policy and consumer protection’. 49. However, a national law which prohibits internet service providers from offering games 💶 of chance and gambling in the territory of a Member State is likely to fall within the scope of Directive 💶 98/34. b) Directive 98/34 50. Directive 98/34 aims to remove or reduce barriers to the free movement of goods arising from the 💶 adoption by the Member States of different technical regulations, by promoting the transparency of national initiatives vis-à-vis the Commission, European 💶 standardisation bodies and the other Member States. 51. The ambit of Directive 98/34 was extended by Directive 98/48 to all services 💶 of the information society, that is to say, according to Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34, any service normally provided for 💶 remuneration by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services. 52. The term ‘technical regulation’ is defined 💶 as follows in Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34: ‘Technical specifications and other requirements or rules on services, including the relevant administrative 💶 provisions, the observance of which is compulsory, de jure or de facto, in the case of marketing, provision of a 💶 service, establishment of a service operator or use in a Member State or a major part thereof, as well as 💶 laws, regulations or administrative provisions of Member States, except those provided for in Article 10, prohibiting the manufacture, importation, marketing 💶 or use of a product or prohibiting the provision or use of a service, or establishment as a service provider. …’ 53. 💶 Therefore Directive 98/34 provides for a system whereby each Member State must notify the Commission of its proposed technical regulations 💶 so as to enable the Commission and the other Member States to inform it of their viewpoint and to propose 💶 a standardisation which is less restrictive of trade. This system also gives the Commission the necessary time to propose, if 💶 necessary, a binding standardisation measure. 54. Article 8 of Directive 98/34 reads as follows: ‘1. … Member States shall immediately communicate to 💶 the Commission any draft technical regulation, except where it merely transposes the full text of an international or European standard, 💶 in which case information regarding the relevant standard shall suffice; they shall also let the Commission have a statement of 💶 the grounds which make the enactment of such a technical regulation necessary, where these have not already been made clear 💶 in the draft. … The Commission shall immediately notify the other Member States of the draft and all documents which have been 💶 forwarded to it; it may also refer this draft, for an opinion, to the Committee referred to in Article 5 💶 and, where appropriate, to the committee responsible for the field in question. … 2. The Commission and the Member States may make 💶 comments to the Member State which has forwarded a draft technical regulation; that Member State shall take such comments into 💶 account as far as possible in the subsequent preparation of the technical regulation. 3. Member States shall communicate the definitive text 💶 of a technical regulation to the Commission without delay. …’ 55. Article 9 of Directive 98/34 provides as follows: ‘1. Member States shall 💶 postpone the adoption of a draft technical regulation for three months from the date of receipt by the Commission of 💶 the communication referred to in Article 8(1). 2. Member States shall postpone: … – without prejudice to paragraphs 4 and 5, for four 💶 months the adoption of any draft rule on services, from the date of receipt by the Commission of the communication 💶 referred to in Article 8(1) if the Commission or another Member State delivers a detailed opinion, within three months of 💶 that date, to the effect that the measure envisaged may create obstacles to the free movement of services or to 💶 the freedom of establishment of service operators within the internal market. … 4. Member States shall postpone the adoption of a draft 💶 technical regulation for 12 months from the date of receipt by the Commission of the communication referred to in Article 💶 8(1) if, within the three months following that date, the Commission announces its finding that the draft technical regulation concerns 💶 a matter which is covered by a proposal for a directive, regulation or decision presented to the Council in accordance 💶 with Article 189 of the [EC] Treaty [now Article 249 EC]. …’ 2. Primary law and its interpretation 56. The regulations of the 💶 Member States concerning games of chance and gambling must not interfere with the obligations of the Member States in the 💶 context of the EC Treaty, particularly in relation to the freedoms of movement. a) The Treaty 57. The first paragraph of Article 💶 49 EC prohibits restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Community in respect of nationals of Member States 💶 who are established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are 💶 intended. 58. Under Articles 48 and 55 EC, Article 49 is applicable to the services offered by a company formed in 💶 accordance with the law of a Member State and having its registered office, central administration or principal place of business 💶 within the Community. b) Case-law 59. The problem of whether the laws of the Member States concerning games of chance and gambling 💶 are consistent with the fundamental freedoms of movement have given rise to a relatively large body of case-law, the main 💶 outlines of which may be described as follows. 60. Games of chance and gambling are an economic activity within the meaning 💶 of Article 2 EC. ( ) They consist in the provision of a particular service, namely the hope of making 💶 a cash profit, in return for remuneration. 61. They are also a service activity which falls within the scope of Articles 💶 43 and 49 EC concerning the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. National legislation prohibiting or restricting 💶 the right to operate games of chance and gambling in a Member State may therefore be a restriction of those 💶 freedoms of movement. ( ) 62. However, the Court has consistently held that such games represent a particular economic activity for 💶 the following reasons. First, in all the Member States, moral, religious or cultural considerations tend to restrict, or even prohibit, 💶 such games to prevent them from being a source of private profit. Secondly, games of chance and gambling involve a 💶 high risk of crime or fraud, given the size of the potential winnings. In addition, they are an encouragement to 💶 spend which may have damaging individual and social consequences. Finally, although this cannot in itself be regarded as an objective 💶 justification, it is not without relevance that lotteries may make a significant contribution to the financing of benevolent or public 💶 interest activities such as social works, charitable works, sport or culture. ( ) 63. Lotteries organised on a large scale, ( 💶 ) gaming machines, ( ) betting on sporting events ( ) and casino gambling and games ( ) have been 💶 considered likely to create a high risk of crime and fraud because of the considerable sums involved, and also a 💶 risk to consumers because they are an encouragement to spend. ( ) 64. The Member States may legitimately provide for restrictions 💶 on the operation of games with those characteristics, on grounds of consumer protection (limiting the passion of human beings for 💶 gaming, preventing citizens from being tempted to spend excessively on gaming) and defending the social order (preventing the risks of 💶 crime and fraud created by gaming). These are reasons of overriding general interest which may justify restrictions on the freedoms 💶 of movement. ( ) 65. On the other hand, using income from gaming to finance social activities cannot be a justification 💶 as such. The Court bases that assessment on the principle that the diminution or reduction of tax revenue is not 💶 one of the grounds listed in Article 46 EC and does not constitute a matter of overriding general interest. ( 💶 ) Using the income from gaming in that way is only an incidental beneficial consequence of a restriction. ( ) 66. 💶 Determining the necessary degree of protection for consumers and the maintenance of public order with regard to games of chance 💶 and gambling is a matter for the Member States. 67. According to the Court, the national authorities must be allowed a 💶 sufficient margin of discretion to determine the requirements entailed by the protection of gamblers and, more generally, taking account of 💶 the social and cultural characteristics of each Member State, the preservation of public order, with regard to the organisational arrangements 💶 of gaming and betting and the amount of stakes, as well the use made of the profits to which they 💶 give rise. ( ) The Member States are therefore free to set the objectives of their policy on betting and 💶 gaming and, where appropriate, to define in detail the degree of protection sought. ( ) 68. However, in order to be 💶 justified, a national measure restricting a freedom of movement must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; must be appropriate for 💶 securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues; and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to 💶 attain that objective. ( ) 69. In the context of monitoring compliance with those conditions, the Court has stated on several 💶 occasions that the reasons justifying the restrictions laid down by the measure in question must be considered together. ( ) 70. 💶 The Court has accepted that the following restrictions may be justified. 71. A Member State has the right to prohibit entirely 💶 any gaming in its territory. ( ) According to the Court, it is for those authorities to consider whether, in 💶 the context of the aim pursued, it is necessary to prohibit activities of that kind, totally or partially, or only 💶 to restrict them and to lay down more or less rigorous procedures for controlling them. ( ) 72. A Member State 💶 may also grant a single entity or a limited number of operators an exclusive right to operate gaming and betting. 💶 ( ) 73. The Court considers that the authorisation by a Member State for the operation of gaming and betting activities 💶 by an entity with an exclusive right or by a specified number of operators is not incompatible with the aims 💶 of protecting consumers from being tempted to spend excessively and maintaining public order. According to the Court, limited authorisation of 💶 games of chance and gambling on an exclusive basis, which has the advantage of confining the desire to gamble and 💶 the operation of gambling within controlled channels, of preventing the risk of fraud or crime in the context of such 💶 operation, and of using the resulting profits for public interest purposes, likewise falls within the ambit of those objectives. ( 💶 ) 74. In addition, the mere fact that a Member State has opted for a system of protection which differs from 💶 that adopted by another Member State cannot affect the assessment of the need for, and proportionality of, the provisions enacted 💶 to that end. Those provisions must be assessed solely by reference to the objectives pursued by the national authorities of 💶 the Member State concerned and the degree of protection which they are intended to provide. ( ) 75. In Läärä and 💶 Others, the Court also examined the question of whether, to attain the objectives pursued by the Finnish law concerning the 💶 operation of gaming machines, it was preferable, rather than granting an exclusive operating right to the licensed public body, to 💶 adopt regulations imposing the necessary code of conduct on the operators concerned. 76. The Court stated that that question was a 💶 matter to be assessed by the Member States, subject however to the proviso that the choice made in that regard 💶 must not be disproportionate to the aim pursued. ( ) The Court took the view that that condition was fulfilled 💶 because the body with the exclusive right to operate the slot machines was a public-law association the activities of which 💶 were carried on under the control of the State and which was required to pay over to the State the 💶 amount of the net distributable proceeds received from the operation of the slot machines. ( ) 77. The Court added that, 💶 while it was true that the sums thus received by the State for public interest purposes could equally be obtained 💶 by other means, such as taxation of the activities of the various operators authorised to pursue them within the framework 💶 of rules of a non-exclusive nature; however, the obligation imposed on the licensed public body, requiring it to pay over 💶 the proceeds of its operations, constituted a measure which, given the risk of crime and fraud, was certainly more effective 💶 in ensuring that strict limits were set to the lucrative nature of such activities. ( ) 78. In Zenatti, Gambelli and 💶 Others, and Placanica and Others, cited above, the Court spelt out more clearly the conditions which national legislation must satisfy 💶 in order to be justified with particular regard to the Italian law granting a limited number of organisations fulfilling certain 💶 criteria an exclusive right to organise betting. 79. In Zenatti, the Court observed that the Italian legislation in question sought to 💶 prevent such gaming from being a source of private profit, to avoid risks of crime and fraud and the damaging 💶 individual and social consequences of the incitement to spend which it represents and to allow it only to the extent 💶 to which it may be socially useful as being conducive to the proper conduct of competitive sports. ( ) 80. The 💶 Court stated that such legislation could be justified only if, from the outset, it reflected a concern to bring about 💶 a genuine diminution in gambling opportunities and if the financing of social activities through a levy on the proceeds of 💶 authorised games constituted only an incidental beneficial consequence and not the real justification for the restrictive policy adopted. ( ) 💶 The Court added that it was for the national court to verify whether, having regard to the specific rules governing 💶 its application, the national legislation is genuinely directed to realising the objectives which are capable of justifying it and whether 💶 the restrictions which it imposes do not appear disproportionate in the light of those objectives. ( ) 81. In Gambelli and 💶 Others, cited above, the referring court stated that the Italian law on betting had been amended in 2000 and that 💶 the background documents of the amending measure showed that the Italian Republic was pursuing a policy of substantially expanding betting 💶 and gaming at national level with a view to obtaining funds, while also protecting existing licensees. 82. The Court stated that 💶 restrictions on grounds of consumer protection and the prevention of both fraud and incitement to squander on gaming may be 💶 justified only if they are appropriate for achieving those objectives, inasmuch as they must serve to limit betting activities in 💶 a consistent and systematic manner. ( ) 83. The Court added that, in so far as the authorities of a Member 💶 State incite and encourage consumers to participate in lotteries, games of chance and betting to the financial benefit of the 💶 public purse, the authorities of that State cannot invoke public order concerns relating to the need to reduce opportunities for 💶 betting in order to justify measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings. ( ) 84. In view of 💶 the aim of avoiding gaming licensees being involved in criminal or fraudulent activities, the Court found that the Italian legislation 💶 on invitations to tender appeared disproportionate in so far as it prevented capital companies quoted on regulated markets of other 💶 Member States from obtaining licences to organise sporting bets in Italy. The Court pointed out there were other means of 💶 checking the accounts and activities of such companies. ( ) 85. In Placanica and Others, the Court was once again confronted 💶 with the Italian law on betting on sporting events after the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy) took the view that 💶 the law in question was compatible with Articles 43 and 49 EC. The Italian court found that that the true 💶 purpose of the Italian legislation was not to protect consumers by limiting their propensity to gamble, but to channel betting 💶 and gaming activities into systems that are controllable, with the objective of preventing their operation for criminal purposes. 86. The Court 💶 stated that, in so far as that was the only aim of the licensing system laid down by the Italian 💶 law, a ‘policy of controlled expansion’ in the betting and gaming sector may be entirely consistent with the objective of 💶 drawing players away from clandestine betting and gaming to activities which are authorised and regulated. According to the Court, in 💶 order to achieve that objective, authorised operators must represent a reliable, but at the same time attractive, alternative to a 💶 prohibited activity, and this may necessitate the offer of an extensive range of games, advertising on a certain scale and 💶 the use of new distribution techniques. ( ) 87. As the facts referred to by the Italian Government showed that clandestine 💶 betting and gaming were a considerable problem in Italy, the Court concluded that a licensing system may constitute an efficient 💶 mechanism enabling operators active in the betting and gaming sector to be controlled with a view to preventing the operation 💶 of those activities for criminal or fraudulent purposes. ( ) 88. However, the Court confirmed that the law in question appeared 💶 disproportionate in that it prevented companies whose shares are quoted on the regulated markets of other Member States from being 💶 able to obtain licences for the business of sporting betting in Italy. ( ) B – National law a) Information provided by 💶 the referring court 89. Article 2 of Decree-Law No 282/2003 of 8 November 2003 ( ) grants the Santa Casa the 💶 monopoly for the operation by electronic means of State gambling of a social nature, that is to say, of lotteries 💶 and off-course betting. The monopoly covers the entire national territory, including radioelectric space, the internet and any other public telecommunications 💶 network. 90. Under Article 11(1)(a) and (b) of Decree-Law No 282/2003 the following are illegal: – the promotion, organisation or operation by 💶 electronic means of State gambling of a social nature (that is to say, lotteries and off-course betting) in contravention of 💶 the monopoly rules; – the advertising of those number lotteries, whether they take place in national territory or not. 2. Additional information 💶 provided by the Portuguese Government 91. In Portugal games of chance and gambling are prohibited in principle. Nevertheless, the State has 💶 reserved the right to authorise, in accordance with the system it deems the most appropriate, the operation of one or 💶 more games, directly or through a body under its control, or to grant the right to operate games to private 💶 entities, whether non-profit-making or not, by calls for tender. a) The types of games 92. The Portuguese legislation distinguishes between three categories 💶 of games of chance and gambling, namely casino games, lotteries, tombolas and publicity competitions, and games of lotto and betting. i) 💶 Casino games 93. Casino games comprise table games such as roulette and poker, as well as other types of games such 💶 as bingo and slot machines. 94. The operation of these games is regulated by Decree-law No 422/89 of 2 December 1989, 💶 ( ) which was considered by the Court in Anomar and Others. 95. The right to operate casino games is in 💶 principle reserved by the State and it can be exercised only by undertakings constituted in the form of limited companies 💶 licensed by the State, by an administrative contract. These games are permitted only in casinos in gaming zones created and 💶 defined by legislative measure. 96. There are at present nine casinos of that type operating in Portugal and licences have recently 💶 been granted for four others. ii) Lotteries, tombolas and publicity competitions 97. This category of games comprises lotteries, tombolas, draws, publicity competitions, 💶 general knowledge contests and pastimes. They are subject to prior licensing by the Government, which is granted case by case 💶 on specific conditions. 98. In practice, this category of games has no commercial impact in Portugal. iii) Lotto games and betting 99. This 💶 category of games comprises all games in which the contestants predict the results of one or more contests or draws. 💶 These games are known in Portugal as ‘games of a social nature’ or ‘State games of a social nature’. 100. The 💶 operation of these games is regulated by Decree-Law No 84/85 of 28 March 1985. ( ) 101. Under Article 1(1) of 💶 that Decree-Law, the right to promote lotto games and betting is reserved by the State, which grants the Santa Casa 💶 the exclusive right to organise and operate them throughout Portugal. 102. According to the statements in the preambles to the measures 💶 providing for this exclusive right, the Portuguese Government considered that it could no longer overlook the fact that such gaming 💶 was carried on clandestinely, together with the excesses to which it gave rise. The Government’s purpose was therefore to give 💶 it a legal framework so as to ensure that gaming was fair and to limit its excesses. The Government also 💶 intended that the revenue from gaming, which was morally reprehensible in the culture of that Member State, should not be 💶 a source of private profit, but should serve to finance social causes or causes of general interest. 103. Originally the Santa 💶 Casa organised contests called ‘Totobola’ and ‘Totoloto’. The former covers games in which the contestants predict the results of one 💶 or more sporting events. The latter covers all games in which the contestants predict the results of drawing numbers by 💶 lot . 104. The range of games was subsequently extended in 1993 to include ‘Joker’; ( ) in 1994 ‘Lotaria instantânia’, 💶 an instant game with a scratch card, commonly called ‘raspadinha’; ( ) in 1998 ‘Totogolo’, ( ) and in 2004 💶 ‘Euromilhões’, or European lotto. ( ) 105. In 2003 the legal framework of lotto games and betting was adapted to take 💶 account of technical developments enabling the games to be offered by electronic medium, in particular the internet. These measures appear 💶 in Decree-Law 282/2003 and they aim, in substance, first, to license the Santa Casa to sell its products by electronic 💶 medium and, secondly, to extend the Santa Casa’s exclusive right of operation to include games offered by electronic medium, in 💶 particular the internet. 106. Article 12(1) of Decree‑Law No 282/2003 sets the maximum and minimum fines for the administrative offences laid 💶 down in Article 11(1)(a) and (b) of that Decree-Law. For natural persons, the fine is to be not less than 💶 EUR 2 000 or more than three times the total amount deemed to have been collected from organising the game, 💶 provided that the triple figure is greater than EUR 2 000 but does not exceed a maximum of EUR 44 💶 890. b) The regulations of the Santa Casa 107. The Santa Casa is a social solidarity institution established on 15 August 1498. 💶 It has always been devoted to charitable work for assisting the most disadvantaged. 108. In Portugal, State games of a social 💶 nature are assigned to the Santa Casa. The ‘Lotaria Nacional’ (national lottery), established by a royal edict of 18 November 💶 1783, was contracted out to that institution and the contract was renewed regularly. In 1961 the Santa Casa was granted 💶 the exclusive right to organise other forms of lotto games and betting such as Totobola and, in 1985, Totoloto. 109. The 💶 activities of the Santa Casa are regulated by Decree-Law No 322/91 of 26 August 1991. ( ) 110. According to its 💶 statutes, the Santa Casa is a ‘legal person in the public administrative interest’, that is to say, a private legal 💶 person, recognised by the authorities as pursuing non-profit-making objects of general interest. 111. The administrative organs of the Santa Casa consist 💶 of a director, appointed by decree of the Prime Minister, and a board of management whose members are appointed by 💶 decrees of the members of the Government under whose supervision the Santa Casa falls. 112. The operation of games of chance 💶 falls within the responsibilities of the Gaming Department of the Santa Casa, which has its own administrative and control organs. 113. 💶 The administrative organ of the Gaming Department consists of the director of the Santa Casa, who is the ex officio 💶 chairman, and two deputy directors appointed by joint decree of the Minister of Employment and Solidarity and the Minister of 💶 Health. 114. Each type of game of chance organised by the Santa Casa is instituted separately by a decree-law and the 💶 entire organisation and operation of the game, including the amount of stakes, the system for awarding prizes, the frequency of 💶 draws, the specific percentage of each prize, methods of collecting stakes, the method of selecting authorised distributors, the methods and 💶 periods for payment of prizes, are governed by government regulation. 115. The members of the competition committee, the draw committee and 💶 the claims committee are mostly representatives of the public authorities. The chairman of the claims committee, who has a casting 💶 vote, is a judge. 116. The Gaming Department has a budget and its own accounts which are annexed to the budget 💶 and the accounts of the Santa Casa, and as such are under government supervision. 117. The Gaming Department has administrative authority 💶 powers to open and organise proceedings concerning offences of illegal operation of games of chance in relation to which the 💶 Santa Casa has the exclusive rights, and to investigate such offences. 118. Article 14 of Decree-Law No 282/2003 confers upon the 💶 Gaming Department the necessary administrative powers to impose fines such as those imposed on the Liga and Baw. 119. An appeal 💶 may be lodged against any decision of the Gaming Department in contravention cases and any other decision with effect outside 💶 the Gaming Department, such as decisions concerning the purchase of goods and services and the grant of authorisation to third 💶 parties to sell tickets for games of a social nature. 120. The Santa Casa has specific tasks in the areas of 💶 protection of the family, mothers and children, help for unprotected minors at risk, assistance for old people, social situations of 💶 serious deprivation and primary and specialised health care. 121. Under the law in force at the material time, the Santa Casa 💶 retains only 25% of the earnings from the various games. The balance is shared among other public-interest institutions such as 💶 associations of voluntary firemen, private social solidarity institutions, establishments for the safety and rehabilitation of handicapped persons, the cultural development 💶 fund or social projects. Accordingly 50% of the earnings from Totobola go towards the promotion and development of football and 💶 16% of the earnings from Totoloto serve to finance sports activities. III – The main proceedings and the question referred 122. The 💶 Liga is a private-law legal person with the structure of a non‑profit‑making association. It brings together all the clubs taking 💶 part in football competitions at professional level in Portugal. It is responsible for the commercial operation of the competitions it 💶 organises. 123. Bwin is an on-line gaming undertaking with registered office in Gibraltar. It offers games of chance on its Portuguese-language 💶 website. It is governed by the special legislation of Gibraltar on the regulation of games of chance and has obtained 💶 all the requisite licences from the Government of Gibraltar. Bwin has no establishment in Portugal. Its servers for the on-line 💶 service are in Gibraltar and Austria. All bets are placed directly by the consumer on Bwin’s website or by some 💶 other means of direct communication. 124. Bwin offers a wide range of on-line games of chance covering sporting bets, lotto and 💶 casino games such as roulette and poker. Betting is on the results of football matches and other sports such as 💶 rugby, formula 1 motor racing and American basketball. 125. The referring court states that the Liga and Bwin are charged with 💶 the following offences: – concluding a sponsorship agreement for four playing seasons starting in 2005/2006, under which Bwin is the institutional 💶 sponsor of the First National Football Division, previously known as the ‘Super Liga’, which is now called ‘Liga betandwin’; – under 💶 that agreement, Bwin acquired rights allowing it to display the logo ‘betandwin’ on the sports kit worn by the players 💶 of the clubs whose teams take part in the Super Liga championship and to affix the logo ‘betandwin’ in the 💶 stadiums of those clubs; in addition, the Liga’s internet site began to include a reference and a link enabling access 💶 to Bwin’s website; – the Bwin site makes it possible to place sporting bets electronically, whereby the participants predict the result 💶 of football matches taking place each day in the Super Liga, and of football matches abroad, in order to win 💶 money prizes; the same site also makes it possible to play lottery games electronically, in which the participants predict the 💶 results of drawing numbers by lot. 126. The directors of the Gaming Department of the Santa Casa fined the Liga and 💶 Bwin EUR 75 000 and EUR 74 500 respectively for promoting, organising and operating electronically, as accomplices, State gaming of 💶 a social nature, that is to say, off-course betting, and for advertising such gaming electronically, contrary to the monopoly provided 💶 for by national law. 127. The Liga and Bwin brought an action for the annulment of those decisions on the basis 💶 of Community rules and case-law. 128. The Tribunal de Pequena Instância Criminal do Porto (Portugal) decided to stay the proceedings and 💶 to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘In essence, the question is whether the monopoly granted 💶 to the Santa Casa, when relied on against [Bwin], that is to say, against a provider of services established in 💶 another Member State in which it lawfully provides similar services, which has no physical establishment in Portugal, constitutes an impediment 💶 to the free provision of services, in breach of the principles of freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment and 💶 the free movement of payments enshrined in Articles 49 [EC], 43 [EC] and 56 [EC]. This court seeks therefore to know 💶 whether it is contrary to Community law, in particular to the abovementioned principles, for rules of domestic law such as 💶 those at issue in the main proceedings first to establish a monopoly in favour of a single body for the 💶 operation of lotteries and off-course betting and then to extend that monopoly to “the entire national territory, including … the 💶 internet”.’ IV – Analysis A – Admissibility of the question referred 129. The question from the national court seeks to establish whether its 💶 national law, whereby the exclusive right conferred on a single non-profit-making entity controlled by the State to organise and operate 💶 lotteries and off-course betting in the whole of Portuguese territory is extended to all electronic means of communication, in particular 💶 the internet, is compatible with Community law. 130. The Italian, Netherlands and Norwegian Governments and the Commission dispute or question the 💶 admissibility of the question on the ground that the order for reference does not provide sufficient information on the nature 💶 and the aims of the Portuguese legislation applicable to the main proceedings. 131. I do not think the question can be 💶 ruled inadmissible. 132. The national court’s description of its national legislation makes it clear that it, first, grants the Santa Casa 💶 an exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting on the internet and, second, provides for penalties for 💶 operators who disregard that monopoly. Likewise, the account of the facts describes the issue in the main proceedings. Furthermore, the 💶 order for reference shows that the national court is uncertain as to whether the Portuguese legislation is compatible with Community 💶 law in so far as the former prevents an operator legally pursuing its activities in a Member State of the 💶 European Union from providing services in Portugal. 133. No doubt, in the light of the criteria developed in the Court’s case-law 💶 on the basis of which the compatibility with Community law of a national measure concerning games of chance and betting 💶 must be assessed, I could have expected the national court to give a fuller account of its domestic law and 💶 the implementation thereof, with regard to the Santa Casa’s monopoly, together with the reasons why the monopoly has been extended 💶 to games of chance and gambling on the internet. It would also have been desirable for the national court to 💶 state the reasons why the Court’s previous judgments did not answer those questions and did not enable the national court 💶 to give judgment in the main proceedings. 134. However, the lack of information in the order for reference does not justify 💶 dismissing the question as inadmissible. 135. The question concerns the interpretation of Community law as it is necessary to interpret the 💶 articles of the Treaty establishing the freedoms of movement. The question is relevant to the outcome of the main proceedings 💶 because, if the relevant freedom of movement were interpreted by the Court as meaning that it precludes the grant of 💶 exclusive rights of that kind, the action brought by the Liga and Bwin would have to be ruled well-founded. 136. Finally, 💶 the information provided by the national court is sufficient to enable the Court to give a helpful reply, at least 💶 to the question whether the grant of exclusive rights to a single entity in relation to the organisation and operation 💶 of games of chance and gambling on the internet is, in principle or necessarily, contrary to Community law. 137. According to 💶 settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume 💶 responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the 💶 need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which 💶 it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice 💶 is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. ( ) 138. It is true that the Court has also held that, 💶 in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court 💶 It is regularly observed in judgments giving preliminary rulings that ‘the spirit of cooperation which must prevail in [such] proceedings 💶 requires the national court for its part to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which 💶 is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to give opinions on general or 💶 hypothetical questions’. ( ) 139. Accordingly, the Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on 💶 a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation or the assessment of the 💶 validity of a provision of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the 💶 main action or its purpose, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary 💶 to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it. ( ) 140. The question at present before the Court 💶 does not fall within any of those cases. 141. I also wish to point out that, in spite of the lack 💶 of information from the national court concerning the nature and the purpose of its national law, nine Member States other 💶 than the Portuguese Republic have been able to submit written observations, in addition to the latter, the parties to the 💶 main proceedings and the Commission. 142. It transpires, however, that the Liga and Bwin, as well as the interveners, in particular 💶 the Portuguese Government, have set out in detail the substance and the aims of the legislation in question and that 💶 these matters were discussed at length in the oral procedure. Therefore the Court could go further than examining only the 💶 question whether a national measure granting a single entity the exclusive right to offer off-course betting on the internet is 💶 in principle compatible with Community law. 143. The Italian Government also argues that the question referred is inadmissible on the ground 💶 that the national court is requesting the Court of Justice to give a ruling on the compatibility of its domestic 💶 law with Community law. 144. No doubt, as the Italian Government says, and in accordance with settled case-law, in accordance with 💶 the division of responsibilities under the cooperative arrangements established by Article 234 EC, the interpretation of provisions of national law 💶 is a matter for the national courts, not for the Court of Justice, and the Court has no jurisdiction, in 💶 proceedings brought on the basis of that article, to rule on the compatibility of national rules with Community law. ( 💶 ) 145. However, even if the question referred has to be construed in the way suggested by the Italian Government, it 💶 would still not be inadmissible. Where the Court is expressly questioned on the compatibility of a national provision with Community 💶 law, the Court rewords the question in accordance with its powers and points out that it does have jurisdiction to 💶 provide the national court with all the guidance as to the interpretation of Community law necessary to enable that court 💶 to rule on the compatibility of those national rules with Community law. ( ) 146. I therefore propose that the Court 💶 should find that the question from the national court is admissible. B – Substance of the case 147. According to the information 💶 from the national court, the provisions of Article 11(1)(a) and (b) of Decree-Law No 282/2003 prohibit, first, the organisation and 💶 operation of lotteries and off-course betting on the internet, contrary to the exclusive right conferred upon the Santa Casa and, 💶 second, advertising them on line, contrary to that right. 148. It is also clear that the Liga and Bwin were fined 💶 EUR 75 000 and EUR 74 500 respectively for, first, organising and operating off-course betting on the internet, contrary to 💶 the Santa Casa’s exclusive right, and, second, advertising such betting. 149. Consequently it seems to me that the compatibility of the 💶 national law in question with Community law must be assessed by reference to two sets of provisions. First, in so 💶 far as it confers upon the Santa Casa an exclusive right to offer lotteries and betting on the internet and 💶 prevents any other service provider established within the Union from offering such services on line in Portugal, the legislation in 💶 question may be covered by Directive 98/34. Second, in so far as it prohibits all advertising for lotteries and off-course 💶 betting organised contrary to the Santa Casa’s exclusive right, such legislation may fall within the ambit of Article 49 EC. 1. 💶 Application of Directive 98/34 150. It is necessary to determine whether Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34 must be interpreted as meaning 💶 that a national measure whereby the exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting in the whole of 💶 national territory is extended to all electronic means of communication, in particular the internet, is a technical rule within the 💶 meaning of that provision. 151. In its written observations, the Commission argued that the legislation in question was within the ambit 💶 of Directive 98/34. 152. The interveners, which were asked state their position on that point in the oral procedure, took different 💶 positions. The Liga and Bwin agree with the Commission’s analysis. 153. The Portuguese Government points out that Directive 93/84 was not 💶 relied upon by the Liga and Bwin in the context of the main proceedings and that the national court raised 💶 no question concerning the directive. The Government adds that it is for the national court to ascertain the Community law 💶 applicable to the dispute which is to be determined and concludes that the Directive is not relevant in the present 💶 case. 154. In the alternative, the Portuguese Government claims that Directive 98/34 did not require Portugal to notify the Commission of 💶 the legislation in question. The Government notes that games of chance and gambling were excluded from the ambit of Directive 💶 2000/31 on electronic commerce and Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market. 155. The Danish Government, supported by the Greek 💶 Government, takes the same view as the Portuguese Government. In addition, it states that the disputed legislation, which prohibits the 💶 operation of a certain activity in the territory of a State, is similar to national law which makes an occupational 💶 activity conditional on the grant of authorisation and that, according to the case-law, such legislation does not constitute a technical 💶 regulation. The Danish Government submits that that term is interpreted by the case-law as meaning specifications defining the characteristics of 💶 products. ( ) 156. The Greek Government also considers that a national law providing for a State monopoly of games of 💶 chance and gambling does not fall within the scope of Directive 98/34. 157. I do not agree with the position of 💶 those governments. First of all, I shall show that it is open to the Court to interpret the provisions of 💶 Directive 98/34 although the national court’s question does not relate to it. Next, I shall set out the reasons why, 💶 in my view, the disputed legislation falls within the scope of the Directive. I shall also describe the consequences of 💶 failure to give notice of such legislation. Finally, in view of the Member States’ observations on the relevance of Directive 💶 98/34 for the outcome of the main proceedings, it seems to me useful to mention that the judgment to be 💶 given binds the national court with regard, inter alia, to the interpretation of the Directive, as the case may be. a) 💶 The Court’s opportunity to interpret Directive 98/34, although the national court does not refer to it 158. The fact that the 💶 Court may interpret Directive 98/34 although the national court has not submitted a question on it is clear from settled 💶 case-law. Where the Court considers that the national court has not questioned it on the provision of Community law applicable 💶 in the main proceedings, it examines of its own motion the meaning of that provision. Accordingly, as has often been 💶 said, in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the national court which has referred a question to it, the 💶 Court of Justice may deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not 💶 referred in its question. ( ) 159. It follows that where, as in the present case, the national court has questioned 💶 the Court on the meaning of the Treaty articles establishing the freedoms of movement, the Court may reply by interpreting 💶 a directive which specially regulates the facts of the main proceedings. ( ) b) The contested provisions fall within the scope 💶 of Directive 98/34 160. Contrary to the Member States which have stated their position on this question, I am of the 💶 opinion, like the Liga and Bwin as well as the Commission, that the contested provisions are ‘technical regulations’ within the 💶 meaning of Directive 98/34 in so far as they prohibit any other operator from offering lotteries and off-course betting on 💶 the internet in Portugal. 161. I base my position on, first, the definitions of ‘service’ and ‘technical regulation’ in the directive. 162. 💶 Thus an ‘Information Society service’, within the meaning of Article 1, point 2, of Directive 98/34, is any service normally 💶 provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services. However, 💶 it is clear from the nineteenth recital of the preamble to the directive that it is also necessary to refer 💶 to the definition of ‘services’ in Article 50 EC, as interpreted in the Court’s case-law. 163. As we have already seen, 💶 the case-law shows that a provider established in one Member State who offers by internet, without moving from that State, 💶 games on line to recipients established in another Member State provides services within the meaning of Article 50 EC. ( 💶 ) 164. Next, Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34 expressly states that the term ‘technical regulation’ covers rules prohibiting the provision or 💶 use of a service. Therefore, contrary to the position adopted by several Member States, since the ambit of Directive 98/34 💶 was extended to Information Society services, ‘technical regulation’ has not been confined to specifications defining the characteristics of products, as 💶 was the case under Directive 83/189/EEC, ( ) as interpreted in the judgments cited above, CIA Security International, ( )van 💶 der Burg, ( ) and Canal Satélite Digital, ( ) to which those States refer. 165. The contested provisions, which give 💶 the Santa Casa an exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting on the internet in the whole 💶 of Portugal and which lay down penalties for any operator which disregards that exclusive right, does have the effect of 💶 prohibiting a provider of games on the internet from providing its services. 166. Having regard to the abovementioned definitions, the provisions 💶 in question constitute a ‘technical regulation’ within the meaning of Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34. 167. In the second place, this 💶 conclusion seems to me to accord with the reasons why the ambit of the directive was extended to Information Society 💶 services. 168. It is clear from the preamble to Directive 98/48 that the Community legislature aimed to extend to specific services 💶 of that kind the system of transparency and supervision originally provided for in relation only to goods, so as to 💶 avoid the barriers to the free movement of such services which could be caused by national regulations. 169. The application of 💶 the mandatory notification system provided for by Directive 98/34 to such regulations does not mean that they are contrary to 💶 Community law. 170. As we have seen, Directive 98/34 aims only to establish a system of preventive control. First, by requiring 💶 Member States to notify the Commission of any draft technical regulation, the Community legislature asks them to carry out a 💶 prior detailed check of its conformity with Community law. Consequently the directive has the effect of making it clear that, 💶 if the proposed regulation impedes the free movement of goods or the freedom to provide Information Society services, the Member 💶 State must be able to justify it in conformity with the conditions laid down by the case-law. 171. The notification system 💶 provided for by Directive 98/34 then enables the Commission and the other Member States to examine the draft regulation to 💶 see whether it creates barriers. If so, the other Member States may propose that the author of the draft should 💶 amend it. The Commission for its part may propose or adopt joint measures regulating the topic which is the subject 💶 of the proposed measure. 172. Such a system reconciles the sovereign power of the Member States to adopt technical regulations in 💶 fields where they have not been harmonised with the obligation they have undertaken to each other in the Treaty to 💶 establish a common market, that is to say, a space within which goods and services in particular circulate freely. 173. It 💶 follows that Directive 98/34 is really effective only if all technical regulations are notified, ( ) including those relating to 💶 games of chance and gambling, because these constitute an economic activity and are covered by the freedom of establishment and 💶 the freedom to provide services. 174. In addition, we find that, where the Community legislature wished to exclude games of chance 💶 and gambling from a measure relating to services, such as Directive 2000/31 on electronic commerce and Directive 2006/123 on services 💶 in the internal market, it provided for such exclusion expressly. However, Directive 98/34 contains no provision excluding technical regulations concerning 💶 games of chance and gambling from its ambit. 175. In the third place, this reasoning seems to be in conformity with 💶 the Court’s position in Commission v Greece, concerning the Greek law prohibiting the use of games on computers in undertakings 💶 providing internet services. The Court found that such measures must be considered to be ‘technical regulations’ within the meaning of 💶 Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34. ( ) 176. In the abovementioned judgment the Court found that a measure of a Member 💶 State such as that in issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits access to internet games, concerns access to or 💶 the provision of Information Society services and is therefore within the ambit of Directive 98/34. 177. Consequently I propose that the 💶 Court’s reply to the national court should be that Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34 must be interpreted as meaning that 💶 a measure of a Member State whereby an exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting in the 💶 entire territory of that State is extended to all means of electronic communication, in particular the internet, constitutes a ‘technical 💶 regulation’ within the meaning of that provision. ( ) c) The consequences of failing to give notice of the contested measures 178. 💶 Article 8(1) of Directive 98/34 requires the Member States to notify the Commission of any draft technical regulation. ( ) 💶 Article 9 requires them to postpone the adoption of any such regulation for such period as the Commission may determine. 179. 💶 According to those provisions, the draft Decree-Law No 282/2003 which, first, extends the Santa Casa’s exclusive right to operate games 💶 offered by electronic medium, in particular the internet, and, secondly, provides for administrative fines on operators who infringe that right, 💶 ought to have been notified to the Commission. 180. In its written observations, the Commission stated that it was not notified 💶 of the draft Decree-Law. The Portuguese Government confirmed that it had not notified the Commission. 181. In CIA Security International, the 💶 Court described the consequences of failure to notify the Commission. The Court took the view that the obligations of notification 💶 and postponement laid down in Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 83/189 are unconditional and sufficiently precise to be relied 💶 on by individuals before national courts. ( ) A technical regulation which has not been notified is therefore inapplicable to 💶 individuals and national courts must decline to apply it. ( ) 182. That case-law can be applied to Articles 8 and 💶 9 of Directive 98/34 as they in similar terms to those of Directive 83/189. 183. As Directive 98/34 aims in particular 💶 to protect the freedom to provide Information Society services, an operator such as Bwin, established in Gibraltar, has a right 💶 to avail itself of those precise and unconditional provisions. 184. Gibraltar is a European territory for whose external relations the United 💶 Kingdom is responsible. Consequently the Treaty provisions are applicable to it in accordance with Article 299(4) EC, subject to the 💶 exclusions provided for in the Act concerning the conditions of accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom and the 💶 adjustments to the treaties. ( ) 185. The Court has concluded from the Act that the Treaty rules on free movement 💶 of goods and the rules of secondary Community legislation intended, as regards free circulation of goods, to ensure approximation of 💶 the laws of the Member States, do not apply to Gibraltar. ( ) 186. However, those exclusions must, in my view, 💶 be deemed exceptions to the principle laid down in Article 299(4) EC that the provisions of the Treaty apply to 💶 a European territory such as Gibraltar. Therefore the Treaty provisions on the freedom to provide services and the secondary legislation 💶 adopted to ensure the establishment of that freedom apply to Gibraltar. To prove this, I wish to cite the judgments 💶 in actions brought by the Commission against the United Kingdom for failing to implement such directives on its territory. ( 💶 ) 187. I conclude from this that an operator such as Bwin, established in Gibraltar, has a right to plead Articles 💶 8 and 9 of Directive 98/34 in so far as they relate to technical regulations concerning Information Society services. 188. The 💶 fact that the provisions in question are included in a measure which also relates to the free movement of goods 💶 does not seem to me inconsistent with that conclusion. A technical regulation may be clearly connected with the free movement 💶 of goods or the freedom to provide Information Society services on the basis of the delimitation of the respective fields 💶 to which those freedoms apply, as defined by the Court. 189. In conformity with the position taken by the Court in 💶 CIA Security International, if the Commission was not duly notified of the national provisions in question, in so far as, 💶 first, they grant the Santa Casa an exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting on the internet 💶 and, second, they provide for administrative fines on providers of services who, in breach of that right, offer internet games 💶 to persons residing in Portugal, those national provisions are not applicable as against Bwin and the national court must decline 💶 to apply them. 190. This conclusion should also apply to the Liga, which was fined as Bwin’s accomplice for organising and 💶 operating off-course betting by electronic means. 191. The national court, which alone has jurisdiction to establish the facts in the main 💶 proceedings, will have to determine whether the draft Decree-Law 282/2003 which aims, in substance, to extend the Santa Casa’s exclusive 💶 right to operate games offered by electronic media, in particular the internet, and to impose a penalty in the form 💶 of a fine for infringing that exclusive right, was notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 💶 98/34. 192. The national court will also have to draw the appropriate conclusions with regard to the fines imposed on the 💶 Liga and Bwin as the fines relate to the organisation and operation of off-course betting on the internet, in breach 💶 of the Santa Casa’s exclusive right. d) The effects of the Court’s judgment for the referring court 193. The replies given by 💶 several Member States in the course of the hearing to the question concerning the relevance of Directive 98/34 to the 💶 outcome of the main proceedings could be understood as meaning that the judgment which will give a preliminary ruling would 💶 not, according to those States, be binding on the referring court in so far as it relates to the interpretation 💶 of the abovementioned directive. 194. I take the opposite view. Judgments giving a preliminary ruling are binding on the referring court 💶 even where the Court of Justice rules on a Community-law measure to which the question from the national court does 💶 not refer. 195. I base this conclusion on, first, the relationship between Community law and national law and, secondly, the function 💶 of the preliminary ruling procedure. 196. On the first point, as the Court observed in van Gend en Loos ( ) 💶 and Costa ( ) by signing and ratifying the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the Member States agreed that 💶 the Treaty and the measures adopted on the basis thereof should form part of their national law, should take precedence 💶 to any contrary national rule, whatever it may be, and should be intended to create rights directly in favour of 💶 individuals. 197. They also undertook to take all appropriate measures to ensure the effective application of Community law and that obligation 💶 must be accepted by their judicial authorities. Consequently national courts have an obligation to maintain the rights conferred by measures 💶 of the Community legal order. 198. The national courts must of their own motion refuse to apply any provision of national 💶 legislation conflicting with directly applicable Community law, without having to request or await the prior setting-aside of such legislation in 💶 the internal system. ( ) If a Community measure is not directly applicable, the national court must interpret the whole 💶 of its national law so far as possible so as to achieve the result intended by that measure, in accordance 💶 with the requirement of interpretation in conformity with Community law. ( ) 199. Therefore the national court’s task is to ensure 💶 the effective application of Community law. 200. It is true that the national court discharges those obligations in conformity with its 💶 domestic rules of procedure, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 💶 by virtue of which, first, those rules must not be less favourable than those applicable to maintain the rights conferred 💶 by domestic law and, second, they must not be framed in such a way as to render impossible in practice 💶 or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law. ( ) 201. Where, in the context of a dispute 💶 before a national court, the parties have not invoked the relevant Community rule, it may happen that that rule is 💶 not applied, as the Court’s case-law concerning the significance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness stands at present. 202. According 💶 to the Court’s case-law, a national court must raise of its own motion the relevant point of Community law where, 💶 under national law, it must or may do so in relation to a binding rule of national law. ( ) 💶 On the other hand, it is not obliged to do so where it has no such obligation or option under 💶 national law and where the parties were given a genuine opportunity to raise a plea based on Community law in 💶 the course of the proceedings. ( ) Furthermore, national courts are not required to raise of their own motion a 💶 plea alleging infringement of Community provisions where examination of that plea would oblige them to go beyond the ambit of 💶 the dispute as defined by the parties. ( ) 203. However, those limits to the application of Community law cannot be 💶 transposed where the Court, in the context of preliminary ruling proceedings, examines of its own motion the rule applicable to 💶 the facts of the main proceedings. 204. The object of the preliminary ruling procedure is to secure the uniform interpretation of 💶 Community law by national courts and tribunals. ( ) Uniform interpretation can be secured only if the Court’s judgments are 💶 binding on national courts. As the Court observed in Benedetti, ( ) a preliminary ruling is binding on the national 💶 court as to the interpretation of the Community provisions and acts in question. 205. The binding nature of the ruling is 💶 also the corollary of the national courts’ obligation to ensure the effective application of Community law. 206. This reasoning is confirmed 💶 by the third paragraph of Article 234 EC, which states that a reference for a preliminary ruling is mandatory where 💶 a question on the interpretation of Community law arises before a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no 💶 judicial remedy under national law. In order to prevent Community law from being infringed, a court against whose decisions there 💶 is no judicial remedy under national law, which is by nature the last judicial body before which individuals may assert 💶 the rights conferred on them by Community law, is required to make a reference to the Court of Justice. ( 💶 ) 207. This reasoning is supported by the judgment in a case where it was held that a manifest infringement of 💶 Community law by a court adjudicating at last instance was likely to give rise to liability on the part of 💶 the State, ( ) and also where an action for failure to fulfil obligations could be brought against a Member 💶 State by reason of a national judicial interpretation contrary to Community law, where that interpretation is confirmed or not disowned 💶 by the supreme court. ( ) 208. Consequently the object of the preliminary ruling procedure itself is to ensure the effective 💶 application of Community law. That is why, contrary to the submissions of the Portuguese Government, the Court cannot be bound 💶 by the national court’s assessment with regard to the Community provisions applicable to the facts of the main proceedings. The 💶 Court’s task is to give the national court a reply which is of help to the outcome of the dispute 💶 which it must determine, that is to say, which enables it to perform its function of ensuring the effective application 💶 of Community law. 209. In addition, the Court’s examination of a point of Community law of its own motion which was 💶 not raised by the national court would be of little use if the preliminary ruling, in so far it related 💶 to that point, were not binding on that court. 210. The fact that the parties to the main proceedings did not 💶 refer, before the national court, to the provision of Community law examined by the Court of its own motion is 💶 not an obstacle to the binding effect of the preliminary ruling in so far as the parties had an opportunity 💶 to make their observations on that provision known in the course of the preliminary ruling procedure. It must be observed 💶 that, in the present case, the parties were asked by the Court, prior to the hearing, to submit in the 💶 course of the hearing their observations on the relevance of Directive 98/34 to the outcome of the main proceedings. 211. It 💶 follows that preliminary rulings are, in my opinion, necessarily binding where the Court interprets a provision of Community law to 💶 which the national court has not referred. 212. Consequently I propose that the Court’s reply to the national court should, in 💶 addition, rule that a preliminary ruling binds the referring court even in so far as the ruling relates to a 💶 provision of Community law that was not referred to in the national court’s question. 2. The compatibility of the national legislation 💶 in issue with the freedoms of movement 213. Even if the Court concurs with my reasoning concerning the relevance of Directive 💶 98/34 to the present case and the consequences of failure to notify the Commission, an examination of the compatibility of 💶 the national law in question with the freedoms of movement, in so far as it prohibits advertising of on-line games 💶 organised and operated in breach of the Santa Casa’s exclusive right, does not appear to be manifestly irrelevant to the 💶 outcome of the main proceedings. 214. It is for the national court to determine whether the fact that Decree-Law No 282/2003, 💶 in so far as it grants the Santa Casa an exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting 💶 on the internet, is unenforceable as against the Liga and Bwin, must lead to setting aside the whole of the 💶 single fine imposed on each of them or whether the amount of the fine should be divided between what is 💶 due on account of organising on-line games and what is due on account of advertising them. 215. The question therefore is 💶 whether a national measure prohibiting advertising for on-line games organised and operated in breach of an exclusive right conferred on 💶 a single non‑profit‑making entity, is inconsistent with the freedom to provide services. 216. To reply to that question, it would certainly 💶 appear to be helpful to consider the question from the referring court as to whether its national legislation granting the 💶 Santa Casa an exclusive right to organise and operate in Portugal lotteries off‑course betting on the internet is compatible with 💶 the freedoms of movement. If that exclusive right is consistent with Community law, the question whether the prohibition of advertising 💶 lotteries and off-course betting organised and operated in breach of that right is compatible with Community law no longer arises. 217. 💶 The national court’s question seeks to establish whether its national legislation which provides that the Santa Casa’s exclusive right to 💶 organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting in the entire State territory is extended to all means of electronic communication, 💶 in particular the internet, is inconsistent with Community law and, in particular, the freedom to provide services, the freedom of 💶 establishment and the free movement of capital and payments, as laid down in Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 56 💶 EC. 218. At this stage of the discussion, it could be asked whether the freedoms of movement are relevant to the 💶 main proceedings in view of the fact that the Santa Casa has been granted a monopoly of the operation of 💶 lotteries and off-course betting on the internet on grounds of consumer protection and safeguarding public order against the adverse effect 💶 of such gaming. A national monopoly based on such grounds could be regarded as pursuing a public interest aim. ( 💶 ) 219. It could therefore have been asked whether the Santa Casa could avail itself of Article 86(2) EC, which states 💶 that undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest are to be subject to the rules of 💶 the Treaty in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in 💶 fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. 220. However, neither the referring court nor the Portuguese Government have mentioned those 💶 provisions. Assuming that they had done so, I do not think an examination of the present case from the viewpoint 💶 of Article 86(2) EC would have led to a different result from the reply which I am going to propose 💶 should be given by the Court to the question from the referring court. 221. In view of the case-law on the 💶 implications of Article 86(2) EC, the exception, provided for by that Article, to the application of the rules of the 💶 Treaty aiming to establish a common market can apply only if the task of the entity holding the monopoly makes 💶 it necessary to set aside those rules. In other words, the applicability of the exception is subject to proof that 💶 application of the rules would make it impossible to perform that task. ( ) 222. I believe that examination of that 💶 condition would have led to consideration of the adequacy of the disputed legislation for achieving its aims and of its 💶 proportionality comparable with the examination which I shall make in the context of its compatibility by reference to the relevant 💶 freedom of movement. 223. I shall show that the disputed legislation should, with regard to the facts of the main proceedings, 💶 be examined by reference to Article 49 EC because it constitutes a restriction within the meaning of that Article. I 💶 shall then consider whether such legislation can be justified. a) The relevant freedom of movement 224. Like the Liga, Bwin, the Netherlands, 💶 Austrian and Portuguese Governments and also the Commission, I am of the opinion that the compatibility of the legislation in 💶 question with Community law must be examined by reference to the articles of the Treaty concerning the freedom to provide 💶 services, and by reference to them alone. 225. It is clear from the information provided by the referring court that Bwin 💶 is established in Gibraltar and that it carries on its activities in Portugal by means of the internet. We have 💶 already seen that it has been held that a provider established in one Member State who offers by internet, without 💶 moving from that State, games on line to recipients established in another Member State, provides services within the meaning of 💶 Article 50 EC. ( ) 226. It is true that the contested provisions, in so far as they reserve such activities 💶 for the Santa Casa, are also capable of constituting a restriction of the freedom of establishment. However, as Bwin has 💶 not sought to establish itself in Portugal, that freedom of movement is not relevant to the outcome of the main 💶 proceedings. The Belgian Government’s claim that the Liga acts de facto as Bwin’s intermediary does not refute this conclusion. 227. It 💶 must be borne in mind that the freedom of establishment confers upon companies or firms formed in accordance with the 💶 law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community, 💶 the right to exercise their activity in the Member State concerned through a subsidiary, a branch or an agency, ( 💶 ) that is to say, a secondary establishment controlled by the company or firm in question. However, the agreement between 💶 the applicants in the main proceedings does not have the object or effect of placing the Liga under Bwin’s control 💶 or of making it a secondary establishment of Bwin. 228. Finally, with regard to the free movement of capital and payments, 💶 it cannot be denied that the contested provisions are capable of restricting payments between persons residing in Portugal and Bwin. 💶 However, that is only a consequence of the fact that the latter is prohibited from supplying on-line games services to 💶 persons residing in Portuguese territory. 229. As the Commission correctly observes, given that the restrictive effects of national legislation on the 💶 free movement of payments are merely an inevitable consequence of the restriction imposed on the provision of services, it is 💶 not necessary to consider whether that legislation is compatible with Article 56 EC. ( ) 230. I therefore propose that Court 💶 should construe the referring court’s question in the following way: must Article 49 EC be interpreted as meaning that it 💶 precludes legislation of a Member State whereby the exclusive right to organise and operate lotteries and off-course betting in the 💶 entire territory of that State conferred on a single non-profit-making entity controlled by that State is extended to all means 💶 of electronic communication, in particular the internet? b) The existence of a restriction 231. There appears to be no doubt, and the 💶 Portuguese Government does not deny, that the provisions in question constitute a restriction of the freedom to provide services. 232. Those 💶 provisions prohibit a provider of on-line games established in a Member State other than the Portuguese Republic from offering lotteries 💶 and off‑course betting on the internet to consumers residing in the latter State. As we have seen, Article 49 EC 💶 requires the elimination of measures prohibiting the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he 💶 lawfully provides similar services. Moreover, Article 49 EC is for the benefit of both providers and recipients of services. ( 💶 ) 233. Finally, it has already been held that legislation of a Member State prohibiting an undertaking established in another Member 💶 State collecting bets from offering its services on the internet to recipients established in the first State constitutes a restriction 💶 within the meaning of Article 49 EC. ( ) c) The justification for the restriction 234. A restriction such as that provided 💶 for by the legislation in question conforms with Community law if it is justified by an overriding reason relating to 💶 the public interest, if it is appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the aim which it pursues and if it 💶 does not exceed what is necessary for attaining it. In any event, it must not be applied in a discriminatory 💶 way. 235. In accordance with that principle common to all economic activities which have not been harmonised, the Member State responsible 💶 for the restriction in question must demonstrate that it is necessary in order to achieve the declared objective, and that 💶 that objective could not be achieved by less restrictive measures. ( ) i) Arguments of the parties 236. The Liga and Bwin 💶 assert that the Santa Casa’s exclusive right to offer lotteries and off-course betting on the internet to consumers residing in 💶 Portuguese territory amounts to the complete closure of the market for on-line games in that State, which constitutes the most 💶 serious breach of the freedom to provide services. They claim that the restriction is not justified. 237. According to the Liga 💶 and Bwin, Portugal ought to have demonstrated, first, that the problem alluded to by the restrictive measure is really a 💶 serious problem in its territory, second, that that measure is capable of remedying the problem and, finally, that there was 💶 no less restrictive way of resolving it. 238. The Liga and Bwin contend that the Santa Casa’s exclusive rights are unlikely 💶 to achieve the desired purposes because Portugal is not pursuing a consistent and systematic policy of restricting gaming activities, as 💶 required by the case-law. In reality, it is only aiming to increase the revenue from games of chance and gambling. 💶 The Liga and Bwin assert that the games offered by the Santa Casa have expanded considerably in recent years, encouraged 💶 by aggressive advertising. They also state that the Portuguese Republic is actively pursuing a policy of increasing the level of 💶 gaming taking place in casinos. 239. Finally, the Liga and Bwin submit that the objectives pursued by the Portuguese legislation in 💶 question could be attained in the same way, if not better, by a less restrictive measure, such as opening the 💶 market to a limited number of private operators who would have specific obligations. In that connection, the Liga and Bwin 💶 point out that the Gibraltar legislation to which Bwin is subject is some of the strictest in Europe. In addition, 💶 Bwin is said to be a pioneer in drawing up rules intended to ensure responsible gaming to protect consumers, and 💶 also in setting up internal procedures to prevent money laundering. 240. The Portuguese Government observes that the monopoly which the Santa 💶 Casa has had since the 18th century is a legitimate expression of the Government’s discretionary power. The grant of an 💶 exclusive right to the Santa Casa accords with the aim of restricting the practice of lotteries and off-course betting in 💶 order to limit the social risks associated with gaming of that kind and to employ the revenue from them for 💶 social causes. The extension of the monopoly to internet games was a necessary and appropriate measure for offering such games 💶 on line in a safe and controlled way. 241. The Portuguese Government submits that the Santa Casa’s monopoly conforms with Community 💶 law because it is a non-discriminatory and proportionate measure. The Government adds that the grant of an exclusive right to 💶 a body such as the Santa Casa, which functions under the strict control of the Government, is more likely to 💶 attain the objectives pursued. ii) My assessment 242. I shall begin by indicating what ought to be the effect, in my view, 💶 of the limits imposed on the powers of the Member States by the freedoms of movement in the area of 💶 games of chance and gambling. I shall then set out the reasons why the protection of consumers and the maintaining 💶 of public order may justify measures restricting the freedom to provide off-course betting on the internet. Next I shall describe 💶 the criteria for determining whether the legislation in question is appropriate for attaining the aims it pursues and whether it 💶 goes beyond those aims. Finally, I shall point out that the referring court must ensure that the contested restriction is 💶 applied in a non-discriminatory way. – The effect of the limits imposed on the powers of the Member States in the 💶 area of games of chance and gambling 243. It is not disputed that, in the absence of harmonised rules at Community 💶 level in the gaming sector, Member States remain competent to define the conditions for the pursuit of activities in that 💶 sector. However, they must, when exercising their powers in this area, respect the freedoms of movement. ( ) 244. I think 💶 an assessment of the effect of that limitation on the powers of the Member States should start from the following 💶 premise. 245. In my view, Community law does not aim to subject games of chance and gambling to the laws of 💶 the market. The establishment of a market which would be as open as possible was intended by the Member States 💶 as the basis of the European Economic Community because competition, if it is fair, generally ensures technological progress and improves 💶 the qualities of a service or product while ensuring a reduction in costs. It therefore benefits consumers because they can 💶 also benefit from products and services of better quality at a better price. In that way competition is a source 💶 of progress and development. 246. However, these advantages do not arise in the area of games of chance and gambling. Calling 💶 for tenders from service providers in that field, which would necessarily lead them to offer ever more attractive games in 💶 order to make bigger profits, does not seem to me a source of progress and development. Likewise I fail to 💶 see what progress there would be in making it easier for consumers to take part in national lotteries organised in 💶 each Member State and to bet on all the horse races or sporting events in the Union. 247. The situation is 💶 not comparable in any way with, for example, the movement of patients within the Union, which the Court has perfectly 💶 legitimately promoted because it extends the range of medical treatment offered to every citizen of the Union by giving him 💶 or her access to the health services of other Member States. 248. Games of chance and gambling, for their part, can 💶 only function and continue if the great majority of players lose more than they win. Opening the market in that 💶 field, which would increase the share of household budgets spent on gaming, would only have the inevitable consequence, for most 💶 of them, of reducing their resources. 249. Therefore limiting the powers of the Member States in the field of games of 💶 chance and gambling does not have the aim of establishing a common market and the liberalisation of that area of 💶 activity. 250. This is shown by the fact that the Court has consistently held that the Member States have a broad 💶 discretion, not only to determine the level of consumer protection and to maintain public order in relation to games of 💶 chance and gambling, but also in relation to the arrangements for organising them. 251. This conclusion also appears to be corroborated 💶 by the fact that the Court has held that the Member States may legitimately determine the appropriation of the revenue 💶 from games of chance and gambling and may thus decide that private interests should not profit from them. 252. Consequently a 💶 Member State has sovereign power to prohibit a game in its territory, as the Court held with regard to the 💶 prohibition of large-scale lotteries in the United Kingdom in Schindler. In order to channel the provision of games into a 💶 controlled system and to protect consumers from being exposed to improper encouragement, a Member State may also grant an exclusive 💶 right to organise a game to a single entity or to a limited number of operators. 253. The difficulties in determining 💶 whether national law conforms with Community law arise mainly where Member States grant a single entity or a limited number 💶 of operators an exclusive right to operate games of chance and gambling. 254. The problem for national courts is in ascertaining 💶 the level above which the provision of games in the context of an exclusive right exceeds what is justified by 💶 the aim of channelling them into a controlled system to maintain public order and to protect consumers from harmful gambling 💶 habits. 255. The national courts must therefore determine whether the restrictive measures laid down by their domestic law are appropriate for 💶 attaining their objectives of protection and proportionate when the single entity or the operators with the exclusive right to operate 💶 a game of chance or gambling offer a certain range of games and carry out some advertising. 256. In considering whether 💶 the restrictive measures can attain the objectives pursued and whether they are proportionate, I think account must be taken of 💶 the fact that, as there is no Community harmonisation, determining the range of games offered and the conditions for operating 💶 them are matters within the discretion of the Member States. It falls to each Member State to assess, having regard 💶 to its own situation and its social and cultural characteristics, the balance to find between, on the one hand, an 💶 attractive range of games in order to satisfy the desire to gamble and to channel it into a lawful system 💶 and, on the other, a range which encourages too much gambling. 257. With regard to my premiss concerning the role of 💶 competition in relation to the aims of the Union, I think that the power of the Member States should be 💶 limited by Community law only to the extent of prohibiting conduct whereby a Member State deflects restrictive measures from their 💶 purpose and seeks the maximum profit. In ot ino se o cassino online se recusa a pagar ganhos. Depois de gastar muito dinheiro e o no cassino, pode ser 😆 incrivelmente frustrante ser recusado seu dinheiro. 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